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Mind Gauging: Introspection as a Public Epistemic Resource
Gualtiero Piccinini​[1]​

Abstract.  Introspection used to be excluded from science because it isn’t publicfor any question about mental states, only the person whose states are in question can answer by introspecting.  However, we often use introspective reports to gauge each other’s minds, and contemporary psychologists generate data from them.  I argue that some uses of introspection are as public as any scientific method.

In the beginning of Psychology, many influential psychologists viewed verbal reports, and more precisely introspection, as the only valid method for data-collection in psychology.  At a later period, during the reign of behaviorism, verbal reports were almost totally rejected as data.  It is now time for verbal reports to reassume their position as a rich source of data, combinable with other data, that can be part of the greatest value in providing an integrated and full account of cognitive processes and structures. 
Ericsson and Simon​[2]​

Introduction.  I feel tired, this page looks white to me, but I’m thinking I can’t procrastinate any more—these are introspective reports.  Introspection endows people with noninferential knowledge of some mental states, but it’s private:  I can introspect my mind not yours; you can introspect your mind not mine.  Partly because of introspection’s privacy, behaviorist psychologists refused its use in research (see e.g., Watson 1913, Richards 1996).  Then behaviorism went out of fashion, and since about the 1950s, psychologists have been toying with introspective reports.  For instance, A. Newell and H. Simon’s research on human problem solving was largely based on subjects’ reports about what was happening in their minds while tackling some puzzle  (Newell and Simon 1972).  A. Goldman (1997) reviews how introspective reports are put to work in many fields of research:  psychophysics, perception psychology, metacognition, and neuropsychology (ib., 528-531).  Like other scientists, psychologists formulate hypotheses and test them against their empirical evidence—some of which comes from introspection.
But other scientists collect their evidence by public methods, namely, methods that different investigators can apply to the same question with the same results.  The publicity thesis, a venerable principle of scientific methodology, requires all scientific methods to be public, and Goldman (1997) argues that psychologists’ adoption of introspective reports is incompatible with the publicity thesis.  
After reviewing Goldman’s view (section one), I’ll argue that the proper use of introspective reports goes hand in hand with the publicity thesis—as it should.  In our everyday life, we rely on others’ introspection to gauge their minds, but we don’t always trust what they say:  We assess the accuracy of our neighbors’ introspection by means of public epistemic resources (section two).  If we—who have no scientific theories or methodology—can do this, so can psychologists.  As soon as we understand how psychologists handle introspection (section three) and what the issue of introspection’s reliability is (section four), we see why its use in psychology is unobjectionable.  By relying upon a theory of introspection (section five), psychologists can produce empirical, public evidence that introspection is reliable under many circumstances (section six).  Moreover, psychologists generate data from introspective reports following standard, public procedures (section seven).  In the end, the way psychologists learn from introspection is as public as any other scientific method.

1. Goldman on Introspection, Publicity, and Reliability.  We are discussing methods of collecting empirical evidence.  So, by method I mean evidence-producing empirical method, viz. what’s normally described in the methods section of scientific articles.  Public method is defined as follows:
Def: M is a public method if and only if:
(A) All investigators can apply M to the same questions. 
(B) If different investigators applied M to the same question, M would generate the same data.​[3]​
With these preliminaries set, we can turn to Goldman’s view about introspection.​[4]​	
	Goldman says:  “Introspection is presumably a method that is applied ‘directly’ to one's own mental condition and issues in beliefs about that condition” (Goldman 1997, 532).  Though methods are usually explained by giving instructions, Goldman gives no instructions on how to introspect, so it’s unclear what he means by "a method that is applied ‘directly’ to one's own mental condition."  In any case, when cognitive scientists collect data, this is one method they are alleged to rely upon:
[T]he scientist relies on the subject's introspective process, which discloses a private, subjective event . . .  Can it be maintained, however, that the introspected event is itself treated as a piece of evidence, or datum, for cognitive science? . . .  Yes, I think it is. . . . To the extent that cognitive scientists trust the subject's quasi-observation to disclose a certain mental fact, they treat this fact as a datum for cognitive science to explain, or as evidence that can be used to confirm or disconfirm hypothesis.  Since this is just the sort of thing cognitive scientists frequently do, they appear to rely on introspection as an evidence-conferring method (Goldman 1997, 533).
According to Goldman, then, introspecting subjects are observers gathering data, which they convey through introspective reports.  Psychologists exploit introspection, in Goldman’s opinion, by taking the data collected by each introspecting subject and using them to test their hypotheses.  But then, psychologists violate the definition of public method:  Any subject introspects, and therefore collects data about, her own mind only, while clause (A) requires that all investigators can apply the same method to answer the same questions.  Given Goldman’s account of this sort of data collection, psychologists apply a private method (Goldman 1997, 534).   
It follows that psychologists violate the publicity thesis, which requires that all scientific methods be public.  Goldman is in good company:  Many think introspection is at odds with the publicity thesis.  Partly because of this, some philosophers banned introspection from psychology; here are some recent examples:
[Introspection] is not useful as an instrument for gaining direct knowledge about our brains, minds, or cognitive processes (Lyons 1986, 150).
[S]ince you can never "see directly" into people's minds, but have to take their words for it, any such facts as there are about mental events are not among the data of science, since they can never be properly verified by objective methods.  This methodological scruple . . . is the ruling principle of all experimental psychology and neuroscience today (Dennett 1991, 70, emphasis original).
On the resolution above, however, Goldman deserts his company.  Private as it is, introspection might well be a reliable method for gathering psychological evidence, and therefore—he says—a legitimate one (Goldman 1997, 525-526).  Instead of introspection, Goldman finds flaws with the publicity thesis:  All formulations of the publicity thesis that he can think of confer on public and private methods identical epistemic credentials (ib., 533-537).  He concludes that we shouldn’t reject introspection; if anything, we should reject the publicity thesis.​[5]​
To convince us that introspection is scientifically legitimate, Goldman owes us evidence of its reliability.  He has this obligation because, for him, a necessary condition for a method to be legitimate is that the method “ . . . is reliable, i.e., leads to truth a sufficiently high percent of the time" (Goldman 1992, 129, see also Goldman 1986, 27).  From now on, to avoid confusion with other sorts of reliability, I will call the truth-yielding reliability invoked by Goldman G-reliability.  Normally, he adds, "[I]ntersubjective agreement [about the output of a method] is a good indicator or sign of reliability" (Goldman 1997, 537).  In other words, he is saying that G-reliability can be established because a method is public, that is, different investigators apply the method and obtain the same results (as clause (B) requires).  But in the present case publicity is not going to help, because for Goldman—as we know—the method in question is private.  So, Goldman maintains that a method can be private but still considered G-reliable.
One could establish a method’s G-reliability, he adds, by analogy with instrument calibration:
The readings of a scientific instrument would never be trusted as a source of evidence unless the instrument's reliability were established by standard, i.e., public, procedures (Goldman 1997, 538).
Doing this for introspection, says Goldman, would be hard:
. . .  one would have to compare the (presumptively sincere) introspective reports of a subject with the "actual fact" of what is reported, which itself must be determined by procedures that do not involve introspection.  Since a cognitive scientist cannot directly observe the mental state of the subject, the actual condition of this mental state must be determined by observation of behavior (or stimuli) plus some sort of theoretical, nomological inference.  The basic difficulty is that cognitive scientists lack adequate nomological generalizations that would allow them to draw firm inferences about the sorts of states described in introspective reports, in particular, states of consciousness (Goldman 1997, 539).
Goldman grants scientists two avenues for public validation of introspection’s G-reliability:  They must either directly observe the "actual facts" or make nomological inferences that are independent of introspection’s G-reliability.  But scientist can neither introspect other minds nor, according to Goldman, infer their content without relying on introspection’s G-reliability (ib., 540-541).  As a consequence, psychologists can’t validate introspection’s G-reliability by public means (ib., 539, 541).  
One wonders, then, why psychologists feel entitled to use introspection in their research, or—for that matter—why Goldman thinks they are.  Hopefully they have good reasons; otherwise, we’d better agree with Lyons and Dennett that their methodology is flawed.  Even if introspection is private, even if its G-reliability cannot be validated by public means, Goldman encourages us to trust the G-reliability of introspection.  Unfortunately, Goldman keeps us ignorant of the grounds for our faith; why psychologists avail themselves of introspective reports remains mysterious.  To shed light on this mystery, I’ll reflect on our ordinary ability to discern the content of other minds, and then I’ll explain—in light of those reflections—what psychologists do with introspective reports.  It turns out that Goldman's thesis—that psychologists’ exploitation of introspection is legitimate—is a valuable insight.  But the legitimacy of introspection need not be supported by invoking faith in its G-reliability.  Instead, a look at our ability to gauge each other’s minds as well as at scientific methodology highlights the mistake of both Goldman and introspection’s foes.  There is empirical, public evidence that introspection is reliable under many circumstances, though not quite in Goldman's sense of reliability.  Moreover, scientists’ methods of generating data from introspective reports are fully public.  

2. Mind Gauging.  Introspective reports are informative.  We ask each other how we feel, what we’re thinking about, how things look to us, and so on, and we learn from our answers.  Our ability to learn from introspective reports is part of a mind gauging skill that we have—the ability to discover the content of other minds.  Let’s focus briefly on some aspects of mind gauging, and see how learning from our neighbors’ introspective reports might be justified.  
First of all, we have what may be called psychosensing skillsknowing the content of minds from perceptual input.  Almost from birth, we respond to smiling adults whose eyes are pointed in our direction by smiling back.  After a few months, we understand—from their behavior—what people are attending to and what their goals are.  For instance, when mom turns her head suddenly to her right, we turn in the same direction and try to locate whatever she must have seen.  (But if a box turns to the right, we are just puzzled by its funny behavior.)  In a few years, we develop a full-blown understanding of people’s perceptions, desires, beliefs, etc.  There is a lot of evidence that many psychosensing skills are pre-linguistic, and some are almost surely innate:  Though some are peculiarly human, we share a lot of them with other animals.  In short, we have a natural ability to respond to the content of other minds, part of what psychologists call Theory of Mind.​[6]​  Not very sophisticated at birth, our psychosensing skills steadily develop along roughly the same path in all normal individuals, until they reach the considerable power that we effortlessly exercise in our adult life.  Serious deficits can occur without it:  For example, lack of Theory of Mind is a currently proposed explanation for autism.  But autism is an exception like blindness or amnesia—psychosensing is no less public than other cognitive capacities like perception or memory.  If we look in the same direction, we see roughly the same things.  If we witness the same events, we have memories in common.  By the same token, if we notice that Rebecca’s eyes are pointing at us, we all become aware that she is seeing us—psychosensing is public.
A second resource to gauge other minds may be called psychospeaking.  As members of a linguistic community, we have a mentalistic vocabulary in common.  We know what it means to feel, perceive, and think; to believe, hope, and fear; to sense pain, itch, and pleasure; to be focused, distracted, and bored; to feel gloomy, excited, and enamoured; etc.  Any competent speaker of our language knows how to apply mentalistic predicates, what mentalistic predicates name what conditions, and what inferences can be drawn from statements that contain mentalistic predicates.  Any individual who shares those abilities with us, we say, understands our mentalistic language.  Those who understand our mentalistic language can share their information about minds, theirs and others’, through first-person and third-person reports.  Embodied within our linguistic competence, we inherit a lot of useful information that we could never acquire by simple psychosensing: wisdom accumulated by our ancestors through millennia of dealing with minds.  Furthermore, every mentalistic term, say jealousy, embodies within its meaning a piece of psychological theorizing, in this case about people’s propensity to jealousy; these bits of theory are a precious part of the common sense mentalistic assumptions of anyone who understands mentalistic terms.  To gain competence with mentalistic language, perhaps we need some psychosensing skills.  Perhaps it’s not possible to master terms like to see without already knowing how to distinguish things that can see from things that cannot, or perhaps language is largely independent of psychosensing.  Certainly psychosensing can exist without language:  Psychologists and primatologists have shown that babies and many animals can discriminate between seeing and non-seeing things, ditto for many other mentalistic predicates.  For our purposes, the exact boundaries between psychosensing and linguistic competence don’t matter; what matters is that we have them both—and that both are public.​[7]​
With psychosensing and language in place, and thanks to our propensity to form beliefs, we psychologize:  We form personal beliefs about other minds, and we share psychological information with them.  Around us, we observe how our neighbors’ minds behave.  We register what our parents, friends, and teachers have to say about minds.  We learn from stories about other minds, and occasionally we even read psychology books.  We accumulate a large body of psychological beliefs, ranging from beliefs about our friends’ personalities to beliefs about how people react to advertisements (i.e., in many cases, by forming desires).  To enter the business of mentalistic statements and generalizations, to find evidence for and against them, we have no need for a scientific psychological theory.  Much less do we need those “nomological generalizations about states of consciousness” that Goldman requires for public validation of introspection’s reliability.  All we need is our psychosensing skills, our linguistic competence, and other cognitive capacities involved in forming beliefs.  Again, the boundaries between psychologizing and other resources is vague, but again that doesn’t matter here; what matters is that we have all such resources.  Since we can trade in mentalistic statements and in evidence for and against them with our fellow psychologizers, this business, like the two preceding ones, is public.
In spite of the publicity of the aforementioned resources, introspection stays private; we introspect our own mindno othersand thereby form opinions about its content.  Introspection contributes to our common sense assumptions about minds.  It helps a lot, of course, in knowing ourselves.  It probably helps learn our mentalistic language and understand others in analogy with us.  Perhaps it even helps develop our psychosensing skills.  Does all this help introduce an element of privacy, spoiling the epistemic publicity of our mind gauging resources?  Not so, any more than our experiencing colors through our private visual system spoils the publicity of our knowledge of colors.  Introspection informs us privately, but its output, to the extent that it contributes our psychological knowledge, is as public as any other piece of psychological information.  After we introspect, we can report our findings to the rest of the community, who trades them on the same market as the output of all of our cognitive faculties.
In the trade of introspective reports, our public resources—psychosensing, psychospeaking, and psychologizing—come especially handy.  When Rebecca tells us something about her mind, we not only understand what she says but exploit our resources to evaluate it.  Rebecca can lie, and sometimes we spot clues that she’s lying.  For instance, many times we asked her what she was thinking, and her answer was: “Nothing.”  Most of those times, we knew she was lying, and often we knew what she was thinking too.  Of course we can be deceived but, in the absence of signs of lie, we take Rebecca to be truthful.  This is good because, like the rest of us, she usually is truthful.  Furthermore, we know that Rebecca can be delusional.  Sometimes she pretends she is calm and relaxed even when she is visibly tense.  In those cases, we don’t take her introspective reports at face value, nor do we think she is lying to us:  We correctly infer from both her report, the way she looks, and other evidence we have, that she is tense but delusional.  Or take Walter, who can’t distinguish some shades of color—a light acromatopsia.  Before he was diagnosed, Walter used to get in heated discussions about the color of things:  “This is green,” he would yell.  We’d laugh and point out it was blue, only to witness his next assault:  “Green, green, it clearly looks green.”  Poor Walter was neither lying nor seeing green; his visual system is such that sometimes he doesn’t recognize colors.  Jennifer, on the other hand, lately has been in a love frenzy.  She goes from boy to boy, falling in love with all.  Or better:  This is what she says, but we know it isn’t true.  We’ve seen her really in love once, and it wasn’t like that.  As to these recent cases, she isn’t in love but she desperately wants to be, though she’d never admit it.  These are examples that, when our neighbors give us introspective reports, we don’t accept what they say without question—we often form an opinion about their minds that’s more accurate than theirs.
Most of the time, though, we take what our neighbors are sayingmore precisely, what we understand of itto be true.  We take their introspective reports to inform us accurately about their mental condition.  This is not because we blindly trust what they tell us but because, most times, their reports sound kosher—not fishy to our well-trained ears.  Moreover, we relate what they say to their environment and to what we know about people in general and them in particular, which usually suggests that their reports are accurate.  For example, our common sense psychological assumptions includes that people perceive objects, that perception is necessary both for certain manipulations of objects and for generating visual reports, and that objects are perceivable only in somebody’s visual field.  So, if Rebecca says that she sees the purple salad bowl, we can (implicitly) check the reliability of her report by looking at her and the salad bowl, listening to her accurate description of the bowl’s color, and noting that she comes away from the shelves carrying the object we asked her to pick.  Under our common sense psychological assumptions, both her report and her behavior hardly hang together with the hypothesis that she isn’t seeing the purple salad bowl.  Although other reports can be subtler to evaluate than visual ones, the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to reports of non-visual perceptions, memories, feelings, etc.  Rebecca’s sincere introspective reports can still be faulty, perhaps because she is victim of optical illusions or color blindness, but for the most part we have plenty of public reasons to trust them.  And when we don’t, we distrust her reports on grounds that are public as well.  
All we need for evaluating introspective reports—besides our common sense knowledge of environments and circumstances—is the set of resources I listed, all of which can be shared: psychosensing, psychospeaking, and psychologizing.  The combination of the above, including our evaluation of introspective reports, constitutes mind gauging.  Like many social skills, mastering mind gauging takes a lifetime, and we can always improve at it.  And, albeit we do it mostly automatically, it is painstaking:  Any new introspective report requires evaluation in its own right, given the evidence that’s available in the context of its utterance.  This stands in opposition to Goldman’s suggestion that, in order to use introspective reports, we must rely on the assumption that introspection is G-reliable.  If he were right, we could never establish that introspective reports are accurate or inaccurate; we should just resign ourselves to trust our neighbors’ reports.  But Goldman’s suggestion is the opposite of our experience:  We start with some public resources and, building upon them, we learn to evaluate single introspective reports—one by one.  In the long run, at most we establish the accuracy of some introspective reports under some conditions and the inaccuracy of other reports under other conditions.  Our mind gauging skill is always improvable; our beliefs about whose reports are accurate under what conditions are always revisable.  We never establish the G-reliability of all introspective reports under all conditions; we are never in a position to say:  We have tested enough introspective reports; we safely agree with Goldman that introspection is G-reliable; therefore, from now on we will trust what sincere people say about themselves without question.  
We can, however, collect the information that we accumulate and ask questions or make tentative generalizations about the minds of individuals or groups:  Andrea gets easily excited; does Lance tend to depression?  Moya enjoys thinking about her Catholic background; Italians perceive public authority as an enemy; who’s more emotional, women or men?  These questions and generalizations are made, and answered or tested, by the same inferential processes that we use in other domains of our common sense knowledge, without need for any assumption about introspection’s G-reliability—which would make our conclusion viciously circular.  These generalizations, in turn, become part of the psychologizing that helps us evaluate future introspective reports.  In our philosophical moments, we might feel inclined to make a generalization to the effect that, ceteris paribus, people’s introspective reports are accurate.  We might even call the process that leads us from individual introspective reports to this generalization a global validation of “introspection’s reliability.”  But this is an empty claim unless backed up by our ability to (fallibly) evaluate the accuracy of any given report.
After all I’ve said, we still can’t introspect other minds or otherwise directly observe them, but—contrary to what Goldman suggests—we have public means to evaluate the accuracy of introspective reports.  These means—not including our general common sense knowledge of environments and circumstances—are a combination of psychosensing, psychospeaking, and psychologizing.  In our normal interactions, usually without being aware of it, we constantly check the reliability of each other’s introspective reports by these public means.  This practice warrants our reliance on introspective reports to gauge other minds.  I’ll argue that psychologists validate their use of introspection through a more sophisticated and rigorous version of this implicit method. 

3. Introspection in Psychology.  While we draw on introspective reports in our mind gauging, psychologists draw on them in their hypothesis testing.  In section one, we saw that for Goldman, when introspection is used in psychology, the observers are the introspecting subjects, the data are their reports, and the method is introspection itself.  Where psychologists are concerned, however, you should hear a different story.
A method is a series of operations performed on some objects and instruments—what scientists call materials.  Any material has properties, and empirical methods are designed to exhibit some fact or phenomenon by exploiting some properties of some materials.  Experimenting is largely a matter of know-how:  In manipulating their materials, researchers need to know how to do what they are doing, but they need not be aware of the details of how their materials’ properties function, much less have a theory of them.  The microscopist needn’t know how her microscope works, nor does the anesthetist need to know everything about how the animal is made insensitive to pain.  In fact, the point of doing research is to uncover something unknown through one’s materials.  As long as materials have the properties needed for a method to work, ignorance of how those properties are generated by the materials, or even ignorance of what properties are at work, does not undermine the validity of the method.
Psychologists use a somewhat special material—people.  No offense, but the subjects of psychological experiments are not in the lab to apply scientific methods; they are part of the materials.  Psychologists instruct their subjects to perform tasks, and then record their performance.  The recording can be more or less sophisticated:  These days, recording rarely consists of simple perception and memory; it involves tape recording or videotaping the subjects’ responses.  Subjects are often instructed to give verbal reports, not necessarily about their mental states.  Such reports are recorded together with any other relevant piece of the subjects’ behavior, and then transcribed.  Transcriptions are sometimes called raw data; they are only the first stage in the production of data properly so called—those that will appear in scientific journals.
The recordings of the subjects’ behavior, or the transcription of their verbal reports, are analyzed according to some standard procedure aimed at extracting some relevant information.  The records of these analyses are further processed, and their contents clustered, until researchers come up with pieces of information that they call data in their scientific reports.
In psychology, reliance on introspection works in the same way as reliance on any other aspect of a subject’s behavior.  Like other scientists relying on other materials, psychologists need not know the details of the introspective process for their methods to be valid.  The introspecting subjects, as part of the materials of the experiment, execute their task, which—in this case—includes giving what philosophers would call introspective reports.  The subjects’ behavior, reports included, is recorded.  Then, records of the reports are analyzed to extract information about the internal states of subjects.  The method followed by psychologists to generate data from introspective reports includes instructing the subjects, recording their behavior, and analyzing their reports according to appropriate assumptions and standard procedures.  This is what psychologists do.  In the context of psychological methodology, introspection is not a first-person "method" for generating beliefs about minds, but only a cognitive process whose outcome is observable behavior.

4. What is the Reliability of Introspection?  When scientists collect data, they face two issues of reliability, which may be called process reliability and method publicity.  
First, raw data must correlate with whatever scientists are trying to detect.  If the instruments are imprecise, if some variable is not controlled for, if confounding factors are overpowering, if some unpredicted condition defeats the intended outcome, then the raw data—no matter how carefully handled—will mislead the investigators.  A lot of scientific ingenuity goes into minimizing these risks—it’s a never-ending struggle.  So, when a process or tool, like a microscope or telescope, becomes standard in a discipline, usually scientists study its properties systematically to determine under what conditions it can be effectively exploited in research.  For example, if a researcher wants to anesthetize animals, she needs to know, for any given drug, animal, and experiment, what dosage to administer, whether what she’ll perform to the animal interferes with anesthesia, and whether anesthesia interferes with what she’ll do to the animal.  That information is specific to anesthesia, and useless when anesthesia is not part of an experimental paradigm.  Creating a correlation between what one is trying to detect and the processes one is manipulating requires a lot of specialized knowledge and skillthere is no general recipe.
This process reliability differs from G-reliability.  Process reliability is about making sure one is handling a genuine correlation, while G-reliability means that a process or method yields truth most of the time.  Prima facie, it doesn’t make much sense to ask whether a process exploited by an experimental paradigm is G-reliable.  A process yields raw data, which are not statements, hence neither true nor false.  How raw data are to be interpreted is the topic of the next half of this section, but perhaps we could interpret raw data, minimally, as claiming that a correlationthe correlation between themselves and what scientists were investigatinghas been obtained.  In this sense, raw data are G-reliable if and only if the correlation they claim obtained actually obtained.  As I said, this correlation is what scientists are striving for, but the existence of raw data is hardly going to satisfy researchers.  G-reliability of raw data is surely desirable, but not very helpful in science unless researchers also have evidence that truth is forthcoming.  If a process is Goldman-reliable but no one knows it, few will think to use it in science, and even fewer will believe the results.  Moreover, as experimenters know, a process used to generate data can be, in Goldman's sense, unreliable.  In many cases, scientists apply standard techniques in a routine way, and throwing away data amounts of scientific misconduct.  In other cases, generating trustworthy raw data may be very difficult, requiring rare talent.  The apparatus might be complicated and fragile; the measured process might be easily perturbed by an indefinite number of defeating conditions.  For these reasons and more, some experiments must be repeated over and over again, until everything “works well” for a sufficient number of trials.  [[Example of Millikan: In his case, many results were discarded, because he had reasons to think they were worthless; he kept only the results of trials where he thought everything worked out well, and won the Nobel prize for it.  (Ideally, scientists should specify under what conditions the processes are reliable, but this can be very difficult too.)]]  Process reliability is about knowing, by a combination of training, experience, and hunches, which experimental trials are successful, and thus which raw data are trustworthy.  To produce good scientific evidence, G-reliability is neither sufficient nor necessary; process reliability is the goal.
Second, the information contained in the raw data must be extracted.  Even if the raw data do correlate with the variables under investigation, data processing might add unwarranted theory-laden assumptions or other confounding factors that ruin the results.  A classical example is the case of R. Blondot and other physicists in his laboratory, whose apparatus was designed to reveal the presence of N-rays.  Since N-rays do not exist, the apparatus correctly showed that there were none—to unbiased minds.  But Blondot and co-workers kept seeing N-rays—and publish papers about them—until their illusion was exposed by physicist R. W. Wood, who visited their lab (Klotz 1980).  To reduce the risk of spoiling the data during their processing, data are analyzed and processed according to standard procedures.  In psychology, to insure a procedure’s reliability, the analysis of raw data is often done by two different observers studying the records of the experiment independently of each other, without knowing what hypothesis is being tested by the principal investigators.  If the two observers obtain the same result from the same raw data, the information they extract is considered trustworthy.
This issue, like the previous one, is different from that of G-reliability.  Rather, it coincides with the fulfillment of clause (B) in the definition of public method.  A method is reliable in this sense if it’s public—if different investigators applying the method to answer the same question generate the same data.  Method publicity is established by making one’s assumptions explicit and by applying algorithms, statistical techniques, or other standard procedures that could be followed by other investigators to obtain the same results under the same conditions.  
Psychologists using introspective reports face the same problems of process reliability and method publicity that other scientists face.  To solve them, they should rely on the same public means that other scientists rely upon.  As to process reliability, they need to assume that, under appropriate conditions, some aspects of introspective reports correlate with some aspects of subjects’ internal states.  As to method publicity, given any introspective reports, scientists need procedures to reliably extract information about mental conditions that could be followed by other scientists with the same outcome.  In section 2, we saw that our mind gauging skill alone allows us to understand, evaluate, and accurately interpret introspective reports so as to extract accurate information about our neighbors’ minds.  For some scientific purposes, our ordinary mind gauging, perhaps supplemented by the results of relevant scientific research, might suffice to underwrite the extraction of data from introspective reports [e.g.?].
But the use of introspection in psychology is so ubiquitous (as Goldman points out), and psychology has become so technical, that relying on our ordinary mind gauging is not enough for many scientific purposes, much like ordinary vision is no longer enough to make accurate astronomical observations.  So, some psychologists have felt the need for a more rigorous treatment of the use of introspection in psychology.  We now turn to the most systematic and sophisticated treatment of this subject, contained in K. Ericsson and H. Simon’s Protocol Analysis (1993).​[8]​  As we’ll see, these authors fulfill all the tasks faced by scientists in validating the use of introspection to generate data.  They present a theory of how introspective reports are produced by subjects, they use their theory to interpret and organize empirical evidence that introspective reports are process-reliable, and they provide a methodology of data processing to establish what we have called method publicity.  I’ll summarize how Ericsson and Simon make these three steps in the following sections.  

5. A Theory of Introspection.  In this section I review Ericsson and Simon’s theory of how people introspect.  Far from construing introspection as a method of observation, they treat it as a cognitive process among others.  Like other processes—they think—introspection deserves psychological explanation, and it can be exploited to generate data.
Ericsson and Simon share their starting point with Goldman:  Psychologists ask subjects to give introspective reports, and this request is one of their means—among others—to probe subjects’ internal states (1, 30).​[9]​  But they soon distance themselves from his position:  The reports, for Ericsson and Simon, are a piece of behavior, which—like any other behavior of psychological interest—is the output of a cognitive process.  The authors refuse to assume that introspective reports are epistemically special, namely, that they are observation reports ready to be used as data (as Goldman suggests).  Like other behavior, reports can be observed, analyzed, and explained; their explanation cannot appeal to any “magical or privileged processes,” but only the ordinary kinds of psychological theories that explain other cognitive processes (xiii, 9).   
Like with other behavior, psychologists generate data from verbal reports, and infer mental states from those data.  Ericsson and Simon want to study both of these steps in a systematic way; to do so, a theory of how subjects produce their reports would be helpful (2, 8).  Such a theory should explain how to interpret and analyze all introspective reports that psychologists use, thereby vindicating the psychologists’ methods.  But different psychologists subscribe to different theories of cognition, so some of them might reject Ericsson and Simon’s theory of introspection.  If they did, researchers would disagree over what counts as data, because Ericsson and Simon’s theory underwrites the very generation of data from introspective reports.  In this situation, different groups of psychologists would have different ways to analyze introspective reports and generate data from them.  Those endorsing Ericsson and Simon’s theory would analyze introspective reports in the way suggested by their theory and treat the result as bona fide data, while those who reject Ericsson and Simon’s theory would analyze introspective reports in different ways and refuse to countenance the putative data presented by their opponents.  Moreover, each group of psychologists would be analyzing introspective reports in accordance with their own theories, and then using the resulting theory-laden data to test their own hypotheses—including, perhaps, some of the hypotheses that they postulated while generating the data.  Ericsson and Simon think that neither of these outcomes is desirable:  Scientists should agree on what the data are, and psychological hypotheses should not be tested using data that are laden by the very hypotheses that the data are used to test.​[10]​  But the special purpose of Ericsson and Simon’s theory affords them a way to minimize these risks; in their book they are not studying introspection per se, but the extent to which it yields psychological data.  If theirs were a study of introspection for its own sake, their theory would be all the more valuable the more logically strong.  Since they are doing methodology, however, Ericsson and Simon can minimize their commitment to any particular theory of cognitive processes.  They formulate their theory of introspection using assumptions that are uncontroversial in their discipline, that is, assumptions that are accepted by all or most contemporary psychologists and thus rule out no specific psychological theory.  As a result, their theory is logically weak, but this weakness allows all researchers to agree on what the data are—the theory is robust (9-10).
Ericsson and Simon see the following assumptions as non-contentious.  First, human cognition is information processing.  Information structures, often coming from perceptual input, are acquired by a central processor and temporarily stored in short term memory (STM).  While in STM, information structures are available for further processing, including the process of verbalization.  From STM, information can be transferred into long term memory (LTM), from which it can be retrieved.  The verbalization process encodes information structures into concurrent introspective reportsreports containing information being processed in STM at the time the report is made—or retrospective introspective reportsreports made after the time when the information they contain was processed by the system (e.g., 11).  More precisely, the most important assumptions made by Ericsson and Simon about cognitive processes are the following (see p. 184, 221-2):
1. Task-directed cognitive processes can be described in terms of the sequence of information structures that are kept in STM.
2. Processing the information structures held in STM takes time.
3. STM receives input information structures—sequentially—from other cognitive processes, whose input comes from either STM itself or perceptual processes.
4. The number of information structures that can be held in STM at any time is limited (independently of the content of the information structures).
5. Information contained in STM can be verbalized by subjects.
6. The input of the verbalization process is either one information structure in STM, or one information structure, previously held in STM, retrieved from LTM.
7. The output of the verbalization process (introspective report) is a verbal encoding of the input (containing the same information).
According to Ericsson and Simon, then, a report is a behavior containing information that is either present in a subject’s STM or retrieved from the subject’s LTM at the time the report is made.  This theory doesn’t entail that introspection is a form of observation, let alone a form of observation that should be trusted by psychologists, and it doesn’t assume that introspection is G-reliable.
Nevertheless, psychologists can benefit from introspection.  The most precious introspective reports, Ericsson and Simon contend, are the ones issued while engaging in well-understood activities, like problem solving or other task-directed cognitive processes.  Ericsson and Simon concentrate their analysis on those reports and intentionally ignore reports about feelings, daydreams, or “streams of thought” (223).  The latter mental states are theoretically controversial, thus reports about them are difficult to interpret and analyze (222-3).  Although Ericsson and Simon don’t talk about all reports, their theory should be applicable, in principle, to all tasks and experimental procedures involving introspective reports (62).  But they also acknowledge that their theory might not cover all phenomena related to introspection—especially those still waiting to be discovered (275).
Ericsson and Simon’s theory may well, in practice, fail to account for some experimental procedures involving introspective reports.  For that matter, it may well be false.  Those are empirical issues of no concern to us.  What matters here is that their theory is supported by evidence available to their colleagues.  Other researchers may disagree, but not accuse Ericsson and Simon’s theory of being based on untestable assumptions, e.g. that introspection is G-reliable.  Anyone attempting to find a better account of the use of introspection in psychology should follow Ericsson and Simon’s steps not Goldman’s.

6. Introspective Reports and Process Reliability.  In section two, I focused on how we gauge each other’s minds through introspective reports; in section three, I suggested that psychologists display their mind gauging skills in their research.  But natural skills are not the most precise instruments of scientific investigation; a lot of scientific progress comes from replacing natural faculties with artificial instruments and standardized techniques.  Ericsson and Simon, with the strength afforded to them by their theory, give a public validation of introspection’s process reliability that’s more rigorous, precise, and sophisticated than anything we can do on our own.  
The authors don’t comment on our ordinary mind gauging skills, but they do take issue with a construal of introspection’s reliability similar to Goldman’s.  They deny that "using verbal data implies accepting the subjects' interpretation of them or of the events that are reported,” which would be tantamount to accepting that subjects have “direct access” to their mental states (7).  For Ericsson and Simon, that’s a “naive theory of consciousness” based on subjective feelings, which should be rejected becausepsychologists have shownintrospective reports are often not G-reliable.  So, they continue, the existence of introspective reports seemingly contradicting a psychological theory is insufficient ground, by itself, for rejecting that theory (216).  But at the same time—they warn—the existence of unreliable reports need not forbid their use in general (9).  The best thing, for Ericsson and Simon, is to entirely avoid the issue of the reliability of introspective reports qua descriptions of “mental experiences”:  The report that p (e.g., “I know the name of the capital of Sweden”) need not be used to infer that p is true, but only that the input to the verbalization process contained some information that’s now contained in p (7).  To determine what that information is, Ericsson and Simon’s put forward their theory.  The G-reliability of introspective reports must be treated as “an empirical issue on a par with the issue of validating other types of behavior, like eye fixations or motor behavior” (9).  It is an empirical question, to be addressed within the theory, “when, where, and under what kinds of instructions informative verbal reports can be obtained from subjects” (9).  Moreover, what the theory aims to establish is that, under appropriate conditions, the reports correlate with information structures present in the subject’s mind (process reliability), regardless of whether those information structures are themselves truthful (G-reliability). 
With their theory in place, Ericsson and Simon argue that introspection is process-reliable in two steps.  First, they predict what introspective reports should look like under different circumstances, and then they review three sources of evidence showing that their predictions are correct.  The first source of evidence is independent of introspection itself, while the other two compare the information contained in different kinds of introspective reports (137).   
First source:  Many cognitive tasks require the use of perceptually available information.  For example, if a subject performing arithmetic calculations with paper and pencil reports that she is summing up two numbers while her gaze is shifting between two digits on paper that represent those numbers, the eye fixations of the subject—combined with the result of her calculation—are evidence of the accuracy of the subject’s report.  This evidence can be gathered because the same information that is perceived by the subject is also available to the experimenters, and can be recorded by a camera together with the subject’s eye fixations.  This is far from trivial:  In the case of Anton’s syndromeunawareness of one’s own blindnesssubjects describe what they claim to be seeing while their eyes point in a certain direction, but there is no correspondence between the content of their reports and the stimuli in their visual field.  In normal cases, instead, there is an experimentally established correlation between eye fixations and the information contained in introspective reports.  So, via the theoretical assumption that eye fixations tell what information is processed in STM, eye fixations give researchers public meansindependent of introspection itselfto establish the process reliability of introspective reports (173).  
Second source:  Ericsson and Simon’s theory predicts that, if identical cognitive processes are reproduced, introspective reports made during those processes will contain identical information.  Subjects can perform a task and give reports on it more than once.  If each time their reports are the same in relevant respects, this identity of reports supports Ericsson and Simon’s theory, and in turn introspection’s process reliability.  It may be difficult to reproduce exactly the same cognitive process in the same subject, because learning and memory intervene between each two executions of a task, making slight changes to the cognitive process.  But some tasks, like mental arithmetic, do reproduce the same processes each time they are executed, and the results corroborate the process reliability of introspective reports (356-7).
Third source:  Introspective reports can be either concurrent or retrospective relative to task execution.  Concurrent reports draw on STM, whereas retrospective ones draw on the trace of a process that’s stored in LTM.  By asking subjects to give both concurrent and retrospective reports on a task, researchers can compare the content of two sets of reports pertaining to the same cognitive process.  Ericsson and Simon’s theory predicts that retrospective and concurrent reports will be mutually consistent, and that the former will contain less information than the latter.  The authors review experimental evidence showing that their predictions are fulfilled (357ff).
By exploiting their theory, Ericsson and Simon muster empirical evidence that introspective reports are process reliable.  Their three sources of evidence mutually reinforce one another, warranting the use of introspective reports in psychology.  As Goldman observed, psychologists neither introspect other minds nor possess nomological generalizations about mental states.  But this doesn’t prevent them from formulating a theory about introspection by exploiting information about cognitive processes supplied by their discipline.​[11]​  Ericsson and Simon do not validate introspection’s G-reliability, nor do they need to do so.  Instead, they interpret all available experimental results and draw conclusions about the process reliability of introspective reports under some conditions and their unreliability under others.  Since they never rely, in their study, on the assumption that introspection is G-reliable—in fact, they reject that assumption—nothing is viciously circular in their proceeding.  Like others who gauge minds, Ericsson and Simon show that psychologists have public means to validate the process reliability of introspection.

7. Introspective Reports and Method Publicity.  Process-reliability is not enough to warrant introspection’s use in psychology.  It would be if introspective reports were, as Goldman suggests, data ready for use.  But they are only the observable starting point from which data are produced.  For introspection to be legit, the method for data processing must also be public.
Ericsson and Simon are well aware that scientific data aren’t direct result of observation, but come out of a delicate process that starts with raw data—like introspective reports—to end with what scientists publish in journal articles.  As Ericsson and Simon put it, data can be soft or hard.  They are soft, the authors explain, to the extent that data processing is based on implicit inferences, especially if such inferences rely on controversial assumptions.  If different investigators, perhaps subscribing to different theories, generate different final data from the same raw data, their data are soft.  On the other hand, data are hard to the extent that all investigators agree on the facts that the data correspond to.  This happens when all assumptions used in data processing are made explicit, and even more when such assumptions are non-contentious within the discipline.  To make sure that researchers generate their final data in ways that other researchers will accept, each scientific community establishes standards for data processing.  When scientists apply rigorous standards in data processing, the result is hard data (3-4, 274-5).
Saying that data should be hard is another way of saying that data processing should be public.  To make sure they extract hard data from introspective reports, researchers must take precautions.  First, introspective reports must be recorded as accurately as possible by tape or videotape, which must be transcribed.  The result isn’t data properly so called but only protocols, namely raw data.  To extract the information they are interested in, researchers follow a procedure called encoding, which relies on theoretical assumptions that—Ericsson and Simon insist—must be kept explicit.  By using the method they propose, Ericsson and Simon hope, researchers of otherwise diverse theoretical orientations should agree on how to generate data from protocols.  The results of encoding the protocols are called verbal or protocol data, and are ready for testing hypotheses and making predictions (5, 275-6).
To make protocol encoding as public and reproducible as possible, psychologists have a number of standard procedures.  The most important procedures mentioned by Ericsson and Simon are the following (see 4-5, 276-8, 286-9): 
1.	Researchers must record the reports rather than take selective notes.
2.	Recordings must be transcribed into protocols verbatim.
3.	Theoretical assumptions used while encoding must be as few and as weak as possible.
4.	All assumptions must be explicit.
5.	Categories that are used to encode protocols must be chosen a priori, before the encoding takes place, on the basis of a formal analysis of the task.
6.	Each protocol segment must be encoded using only information contained in that segment, independently of the surrounding segments.
7.	Inferences and knowledge used for the encoding must be made explicit (ideally, by using automatic or semi-automatic methods of protocol encoding).
8.	The encoding method must be constant from one protocol to another.
9.	A large body of data must be encoded, ensuring that the categories used are not ad hoc.
10.	Individuals encoding the protocols must be blind to the hypotheses being tested.
11.	Different individuals must encode the same protocols independently, and their outcome should be the same.  
All these procedures are analogous to those used for other kinds of behavioral data, like eye movements and fixations.  Ericsson and Simon acknowledge that it’s not always possible or even appropriate to follow all of these procedures.  In searching for theories in new domains, for example, the encoding may be less formal than this methodology suggests, but the authors advise, whenever possible—especially when testing theories—to follow the more rigorous method (6).
With their methodology in hand, Ericsson and Simon conclude that protocol data represent information structures held and processed in STM during the cognitive processes at the origin of the reports (220).  This conclusion, in turn, underwrites psychologists’ inference from protocol data to cognitive processes that are responsible for the tasks they are investigating (e.g., 185ff).  Of course, inferring unobservable entities such as information structures and processes is a "difficult and subtle matter," which I cannot explore here in more detail (examples are given on pp. 313-320, 354ff).  Suffice it to say that current psychological theories and models postulate cognitive processes and information structures, and they yield predictions about what information structures need to be processed and what processes are at work while subjects perform cognitive tasks.  So, the framework developed by Ericsson and Simon vindicates the testing of psychological theories by the data generated from introspective reports (319-320).
It turns out that, far from relying directly on what the subjects say, researchers use introspective data to infer cognitive structures and processes, going beyond the information that is accessed by the subjects who are introspecting.  Moreover, the method of data generation is public, and the publicity of the method is guaranteed by following a number of procedures that ensure that, ideally, all investigators would generate the same data from the same reports.

Conclusion.  Psychologists generate data about mental states and processes from introspective reports, and Goldman (1997) argues that their method isn’t public.  But psychologists treat introspection as a cognitive process yielding a kind of behavior, which can be studied in third-person like any other process or behavior.  Their use of introspective reports is a sophisticated version of mind gauging—that subtle ability to evaluate the accuracy of others’ introspective reports that we all display in our everyday life.  Introspection’s reliability is not something to be established by armchair philosophizing; it takes hard empirical research.  And it will take even more research to devise new and improved techniques to extract information from introspective reports under novel conditionsbesides the techniques and conditions reviewed by Ericsson and Simon.  
Mind gauging is a public practice, and so is the method followed by psychologists.  Introspection can be explained by a psychological theory, which can be used to validate the process reliability of introspective reports under appropriate conditions in the same way as other scientists validate the reliability of the processes they exploit in their experiments.  Moreover, the publicity of the method for using introspective reports in cognitive science is warranted by the same procedures that are used for other kinds of behavioral data.  Neither of these two senses in which cognitive scientists validate introspection’s reliability coincides with Goldman’s, whose construal of introspection—independently of its philosophical problems—is rejected by psychologists as inappropriate and irrelevant to cognitive science.  This explains both why, with the appropriate methodological care, the use of introspection in science is legitimate, and why psychologists have no blind faith in introspective reports.  In studies involving introspective reports as in any other scientific studies, the methods applied by scientists must be public—and, as Ericsson and Simon show, they can be.  Using introspection to gauge other minds goes hand in hand with the publicity thesis. 
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ADVANCE \d 0	


^1	  For helpful comments, I wish to thank Carl Craver, Peter Machamer, Andrea Scarantino, and Becka Skloot.
^2	  Ericsson and Simon 1993, 373.
^3	  This definition differs from Goldman’s definition in ways that do not affect the present discussion.  For a defense of my definition over Goldman’s, see Piccinini 2000.
^4	  A view of introspection’s role in psychology that is similar to Goldman’s can be found in Chalmers 1996, 216-217.  In my paper, I focus on Goldman’s more detailed treatment.
^5	  But rejecting the publicity thesis is far from innocuous.  Different investigators would be allowed to give different answers to the same question by using methods that other investigators cannot apply.  As a consequence, scientific controversies might never be resolved.  I defend the publicity thesis along these linesindependently of whether the thesis is compatible with introspectionin Piccinini 2000.
^6	  There is a vast psychological literature, which there is no room to summarize here, devoted to the study of Theory of Mind and to its scientific explanation.  A good review, focused on Theory of Mind in infancy, is Johnson 2000.
^7	  The large contemporary literature on the publicity of language goes back to Wittgenstein 1953.  A classical argument for the publicity of our mentalistic language is in Sellars 1956, which formulates the now popular view that our mastery of mentalistic predicates can be usefully thought of as a folk psychological theory. 
^8	  Goldman is aware of Ericsson and Simon’s study, and says they “devote a lengthy analysis to the question of when, or under what conditions, verbal reports are reliable” (529).  He does not explain, however, by what means Ericsson and Simon carry out their analysis, vis a vis his professed view that introspection’s reliability cannot be validated by public means.
^9	  From now on, references are to Ericsson and Simon (1993).  I’ll continue to use the term introspective reports, even though Ericsson and Simon prefer verbal reports.  
^10	  Ericsson and Simon do not explicitly distinguish between these two problems, but their discussion makes clear that they want to avoid both of them.
^11	  The theories in many sciences—like biology, geology, and sociology, and unlike fundamental branches of physics—don’t contain nomological generalizations.  Theories without nomological generalizations are theories nonetheless, and they still elicit theoretical inferences about phenomena in their domain.  For a classic argument that psychology falls in this class of sciences, see Newell and Simon 1976.
